“The absence of a necessary party in a foreclosure action leaves that party’s rights unaffected by the judgment and sale, and the foreclosure sale may be considered void as to the omitted party.” 6820 Ridge Realty LLC v. Goldman, 263 A.D.2d 22, 26 (2d Dept. 1999).… Continue Reading
As vaccination rates increase, holds on foreclosure actions expire, and the courts slowly return to addressing their largely frozen foreclosure dockets, we can expect some familiar concerns to reappear. One common concern is the threat of dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3216 for unreasonable neglect to proceed. Given the severe disruption to mortgage litigation caused by … Continue Reading
CPLR 3215(c) requires a plaintiff to take proceedings for entry of judgment within one year of default or face dismissal of the action as abandoned, except where sufficient cause is shown why the complaint should not be dismissed. The purpose of this provision is to prevent a plaintiff from taking advantage of a defendant’s default … Continue Reading
Prior to the enactment of Real Property Actions and Proceeding Law (“RPAPL”) § 1302-a, defendants waived their affirmative defense of standing in a residential foreclosure action by failing to raise that defense in an answer or a pre-answer motion to dismiss. See, e.g., JP Morgan Chase Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Butler, 129 A.D.3d 777, 780 … Continue Reading
In JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Caliguri, 36 N.Y.3d 953 (2020), the Court of Appeals recently clarified how a lender establishes standing in a foreclosure action. Prior to this recent pronouncement, the standard set by that Court had been that a plaintiff evidences standing to foreclose by demonstrating that it possessed the original note agreement … Continue Reading
In a case of appellate first impression in New York, the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that a mortgagor cannot make a Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (“RPAPL”) 1304 argument in opposition to a motion for Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale – even if that was pled as a defense in the mortgagor’s Answer … Continue Reading
In a case of appellate first impression in New York, the Appellate Division, Second Department held that a mortgage is accelerated upon a lender’s election to do so, notwithstanding an optional reinstatement clause in a mortgage. In the Dieudonne matter,[1] the Second Department rejected the “MacPherson Argument,” first pronounced by the Supreme Court, Suffolk County[2] … Continue Reading